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Abstract. Timeout is a short interruption during games used to commu-
nicate a change in strategy, to give the players a rest or to stop a negative
flow in the game. Whatever the reason, coaches expect an improvement
in their teams performance after a timeout. But how effective are these
timeouts in doing so? The simple average of the differences between the
scores before and after the timeouts has been used as evidence that there
is an effect and that it is substantial. We claim that these statistical
averages are not proper evidence and a more sound approach is needed.
We applied a formal causal framework using a large dataset of official
NBA play-by-play tables and drew our assumptions about the data gen-
eration process in a causal graph. Using different matching techniques
to estimate the causal effect of timeouts, we concluded that timeouts
have no effect on teams performances. Actually, since most timeouts are
called when the opposing team is scoring more frequently, the moments
that follow resemble an improvement in the teams performance but are
just the natural game tendency to return to its average state. This is
another example of what statisticians call the regression to the mean
phenomenon.
Keywords: causal inference · sports analytics · timeout effect · momen-
tum · bayesian networks
1 Introduction
In sports, timeout is a short interruption in a play commonly used to stop a
negative flow in the game, to discuss a strategy change, or to rest the players [3].
As this is the most direct way coaches can intervene during a game, their influence
and strategic ability is best expressed during these events. A timeout is usually
called when a team has a rather long streak of score losses [7, 24]. Popular belief
and research [5, 11, 16, 18, 21] have found a positive effect on teams performances
after the timeout. That is, on average, the team asking for the timeout recovers
from the losses by scoring positively immediately after. This observed difference
has been wrongly used as evidence that the timeout has a real and positive
effect on teams performance. In order to answer such causal question, a formal
counterfactual analysis should be used, and that is what we propose in this work.
There is an intense interest on causal models to analyze non-experimental
data since causal reasoning can answer questions that machine learning itself
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cannot [15]. Our approach is built on top of these causal inference approaches
that are briefly introduced in Section 3. For each timeout event at time tr in the
database, we found a paired moment tc in the same game when no timeout has
been called that serves as a control moment for tr, reflecting what would have
happened the timeout had not been called. This control moment is chosen based
on other variables about the current game instant, which were drawn in a causal
graph that depict our assumptions about the generation of the data and, as we
will further discuss, asses if the causal effect can be estimated without bias. In
order to quantify how the game changed just after a given moment t, we proposed
Short-term Momentum Change (STMC), which is discussed in Section 4.1.
After using a matching approach to construct our matched data (pairs of
(tr, tc)), we found virtually no difference between the distribution of the STMC
for real timeouts and control instants, i.e., the estimated timeout effect is very
close to zero or non-existent. Hence, we conclude that the apparent positive
effect of timeouts is another example of the well-known regression to the mean
fallacy [1]. The dynamic match score fluctuates naturally and, after an intense
increase, commonly returns towards a mild variation. Thus, because timeouts
are usually called near the extreme moments, as we will show, the game seems
to benefit to those loosing. In summary, the main contributions of this paper are
the following:
– We proposed a metric called Short-term Momentum Change (STMC) to
quantify how much the game momentum changes after a time moment tr
associated with an event, such as a regular ball possession or an interruption
of the game;
– We collected and organized a large dataset covering all the play-by-play
information for all National Basketball Association (NBA) games of the four
regular seasons from 2015 to 2018. A single season has over 280 thousands
game instants, as we define in Section 4, and over 17 thousand timeout events;
– After a detailed causal inference analysis to evaluate the timeout effect of the
Short-term Momentum Change, we did not find evidence that the timeout
effect exists or that its effect size is meaningful. Inspired by others, we did
also consider two other settings in which the timeout effect could be different:
(i) only the last five minutes of the games and (ii) everything but the last
five minutes.
The next section describes the previous work carried out on the effect of
timeouts and discusses how our work distance from them. Section 3 gives a
background on causal inference and the statistical models adopted. We start
Section 4 by summarizing timeout rules in the NBA and describing our dataset,
the play-by-play tables. In Section 4.1 we introduce our outcome variable of
interest, the Short-term Momentum Change, and in Section 4.2 our causal model.
In Section 4.3, we describe our treatment and control groups and, in Section 4.4,
we explain our matching approaches. All the results are presented in Section 5.
We close the paper in Section 6 with our conclusions.
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2 Related Work
Timeouts are used and implemented in team sports for several reasons, such as
to rest or change players, to inspire morale, to discuss plays, or to change the
game strategy [20]. However, timeouts are mostly used to stop a negative flow
in the game [7, 24], which is popularly referred as “the game momentum.” In
basketball, momentum arises when one team is scoring significantly more than
the other [11, 22].
Several earlier studies analyzed the effect timeouts have for decreasing the
opponent’s momentum in the game [5, 11, 18, 21]. These studies analyze the
effect of timeouts on teams’ performance just before and after it was called.
For instance, by using a small sample of seven televised games from the 1989
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) tournament, Mace et al. [11]
recorded specific events of interest, which were classified as either Reinforcers
(e.g. successful shots) or Adversities (e.g. turnovers) and verified that the rate of
these events change significantly among teams in the 3 minutes before and after
each timeout. They found that while the team that called the timeout improved
its performance, the opponent team decreased it. Other works reached the same
conclusions using similar methodologies and different data sets [5, 18, 21].
To the best of our knowledge, Permutt [16] was the first to acknowledge
the regression to the mean phenomenon in such analysis. Permutt considered
specific game moments—timeouts called for after a team suffered a loss of six
consecutive points. Similar to others, the short-term scoring ratio was observed
to be higher after timeouts. However, in contrast to others, the paper compares
real timeouts with other similar game moments without a timeout. With such
analysis, Permutt found that timeouts can be effective at enhancing performance,
but at a small magnitude. The most significant result shows that the home-team
with a “first-half restriction” presents a 0.21 increase in average ratio for the next
ten points. Calling a timeout predicts that the home-team will score 5.47 out of
the next ten points as opposed to 5.26 points when a timeout is not called. Thus,
the conclusion is that timeouts do not have any significant effect in changing
the momentum of a game, i.e., using 6-0 runs as an indicator of instances where
momentum would be a factor, teams were successful at “reversing” momentum
even without the timeout as a mediator.
Although the work of Permutt [16] innovates by considering counterfactuals,
the analyses still leave room for reasonable doubts about the reality of the
timeout effect. It fails to take into account the existence of other important
factors that could also influence on the momentum change and confound the
true timeout effect. As a result, spurious correlations could have caused the lack
of effect observed in the data. In our work, we take into account other factors
such as coaches and teams abilities, stadium and match conditions, clock time,
quarter and relative score between the teams. More important, different from all
the studies described in this section, we adopt a formally defined causal model
approach [14] with a counterfactual analysis with its constructed control group.
We show in a compelling way that timeouts do not have an effect in teams
performances.
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3 The Causality Framework
For illustration, consider Y our outcome variable and A ∈ {0, 1} the treatment
variable. Regardless of the actual value of A, we define YA=1 to be the value of Y
had A been set to A = 1 and YA=0 to be the value of Y had A been set to A = 0.
We say there is a causal effect of A on Y if YA=0 6= YA=1 and, conversely, there
is no causal effect or the effect is null if YA=0 = YA=1. These defined values are
called potential outcomes [12] because just one potential outcome is factual, truly
observed, while the others are counterfactuals. Therefore, we cannot generally
identify the causal effects of a single individual. This problem is known as the
Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference (FPCI) [8].
Nevertheless, in most causal inference settings, the real interest is in the
population level effect, or the average causal effect defined by E(YA=1 − YA=0).
E(Y |A = 1)−E(Y |A = 0) gives a reliable estimate in randomized experimental
studies, where treatment A is assigned randomly to each unit. However, in
observational ones, we need to collect more information to control for and to
make assumptions. One important assumption is the conditional ignorability [19].
This assumption is satisfied if, given a vector of covariates X, the treatment
variable A is conditionally independent of the potential outcomes (YA=0 ⊥⊥ A |X
and YA=1 ⊥⊥ A |X), and there is a positive probability of receiving treatment
for all values of X (0 < P(A = 1 |X = x) < 1 for all x). The conditional
ignorability assumption allows us to state that E(YA=1 − YA=0 |X) = E(Y |A =
1,X)− E(Y |A = 0,X) for every value of X. This represents the basic rationale
behind the matching technique.
The simplest matching technique is the exact matching. For each possible
X = x, we form two subgroups: one composed by individuals that received the
treatment and have X = x, and the other by individuals that did not receive the
treatment and have X = x. Unfortunately, exact matching is not feasible when the
number of covariates is large or some are continuous. As an alternative, examples
are usually matched according to a distance metric dij = d(xi,xj) between
the covariate configurations of pairs (i, j) of observations. The Mahalanobis
distance [23] is a common choice for such distance metric as it takes into account
the correlation between the different features in the vector X. Another option is
to use propensity score [19] for estimation of causal effects, which is defined as
probability of receiving treatment given the covariates, i.e., s(X) = P(A = 1 |X).
Rosenbaum and Rubin proved that it is enough to just match on a distance
calculated using the scalar scores s(x), rather than the entire vector x [19].
In general, each matching approach can be implemented using algorithms
that are mainly classified as either greedy or optimal. The greedy ones, also
known as nearest-neighbor matching, matches the i-th treated example with the
available control example j that has the smallest distance dij . optimal matching,
however, takes into account the whole reservoir of examples since the goal is to
generate a matched sample that minimizes the total sum of distances between
the pairs. Such optimal approach can be preferred in situations where there are
great competition for controls. For a good review on different matching methods
for causal inference, see [23].
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Whatever matching technique used, its success can be partially judged by
how balanced out are the covariates in the treatment and control groups. By
pruning unmatched examples from the dataset, the control and treated groups of
the remaining matched sample should have similar covariate distributions, when
we say that matching achieves balance of the covariates distribution.
4 The Causal Effect of Timeout
According to the NBA 2016-2017 season official rules, in a professional NBA
regular game, each team is entitled to six full-length timeouts and one 20-second
timeout for each half. A full-length timeout can be of 60 seconds or 100 seconds,
depending on when the timeout was requested. Also, every game has four regular
periods plus the amount of overtime periods necessary on the occurrence of ties.
There is a specific amount of timeouts expected in each period for commercial
purposes. If neither team calls a timeout before a specific time, thus not fulfilling
the next expected timeout, the official scorer stops the game and calls a timeout.
The timeout is charged to the team that has not been charged before, starting
with the home team. These timeouts are called mandatory or official timeouts.
In basketball games, possessions are new opportunities to score in the game.
Each possession starts from the moment a team gets hold of the ball until one
of his players scores, commits a fault, or loses the ball in defensive rebounds or
turnovers. The total number of possessions are guaranteed to be approximately the
same for both teams at the end of a match, so it provides a good standardization
for the points scored by each team [9]. Indeed, most of basketball statistics are
already given in a per possession manner.
Play-by-play tables capture the main play events such as goal attempts,
rebounds, turnovers, faults, substitutions, timeouts and end of quarters (periods).
For each play, we have the time in which it happened, the players and/or the
team involved and any other relevant information, e.g., the score just after the
play is recorded. Each play event is recorded as a new line in the table. While
ball possessions are not clearly recorded in play-by-play tables, one can identify
every change of possession from observing the game events.
In this work, we use play-by-play tables to identify the ball possessions and
use them to observe how the teams’ performance change when timeouts are called.
We have identified every change of possession alongside the main interruptions—
timeouts and end of quarters—in each game. Every change of possession and every
main interruption is considered a new game instant. We model each basketball
game as a series of discrete game instants. More formally, a game instant is
either (1) a regular ball possession; or (2) a major game interruption, which
can be a regular timeout, an official scorer timeout, or the end of a quarter.
Player substitutions and fouls were not considered as a main interruption. In
fact, substitutions can happen when the ball stops and not only during timeouts.
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4.1 Short-term Momentum Change
Here we describe our outcome variable associated with teams’ performance, for
which we aim to estimate how it is affected by the timeouts. Let {Pt} be an
univariate stochastic process associated to a single match and indexed by the
discrete game instants t. At any timeout moment, the team calling the timeout
is defined as the target team. The Pt random variable at the end of the t-th game
instant is the score of the target team minus the opposing team’s score and it is
called the scoring margin. Hence, Pt is a positive quantity when the target team
is winning the match at game instant t and negative otherwise. At the end of
the t-th game instant, Pt = Pt−1 in two situations. First, if t is a regular ball
possession instant whose attacking team did not score, i.e., the possession ended
with a turnover or defensive rebound. Second, if t is a main interruption instant
and, consequently, none of the teams had the opportunity to score.
In order to evaluate how “momentum” changes after a game instant, we use
the Short-term Momentum Change (STMC), which is the amount by which the
scoring margin per possession rate changes right after an game instant. For any
game instant t and a positive integer λ > 0, we define the STMC, Y λt , as the
the average rate of change from Pt to Pt+λ (∆P
t+λ
t ) minus the average rate of
change from Pt−λ−1 to Pt−1 (∆P tt−λ). Note that we do not take into account
the possible change in scoring margin caused in game instant t (the change from
Pt−1 to Pt):
Y λt =
Pt+λ − Pt
λ
− Pt−1 − Pt−λ−1
λ
= ∆P t+λt −∆P tt−λ (1)
for t− λ ≥ 0 and t+ λ ≤ n, where n is the total number of game instants in a
given game.
The hyper-parameter λ controls the time window used to evaluated how
the game scoring dynamics changes around t. To balance out the offensive and
defensive ball possessions, λ must be an even integer. Also, the variable Y λt should
only be evaluated if the interval [t−λ, t+λ] contains no game interruptions, with
the possible exception of t. In a causal perspective, λ represents our assumption
for how many game instants that the interference (calling a timeout or not) at
game instant t can influence and is influenced by, in the short-term.
Let At be the binary indicator that a timeout has been called at time t. We
will denote At = 1 if a team calls a timeout right before the game instant t
and At = 0 if t is a regular ball possession. If we find the set of covariates X
that satisfy the conditional ignorability assumption, we can apply a matching
technique and our average causal effect of interest, E(Y λAt=1 − Y λAt=0), can be
estimated taking the difference in means from the matched treatment and control
groups. The estimated timeout effect TE is defined as:
TE = E(Y λt |At = 1)− E(Y λt |At = 0). (2)
Every game is composed by two teams, the home and the away team. Because
we want to estimate the causal effect of timeouts on the performance of the team
that actually asked for it, we decided to estimate the average causal effect of
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At ∆P
t+λ
t
∆P tt−λ
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U
Y λt
Fig. 1. A causal graph to model the timeout effect.
timeouts called by the home teams (TEh) and the away teams (TEa), separately.
We proceed now to present our causal model which encodes our assumptions.
4.2 The Causal Model
Pearl [14] suggests the use of directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) as a way of encoding
causal model assumptions with nodes representing the random variables and
the direct edges representing direct causal relationships. One can identify in
such graph a set of variables (or nodes) that satisfies the so called back-door
criterion [14]. These are variables that blocks all back-door paths from A (the
treatment variable) to Y (the outcome variable) and does not include any descen-
dants of A. Given that the graphical model includes all important confounding
variables, it can be shown that conditioning on them suffices to remove all non-
causal dependencies between A and Y . In other words, it leaves only causal
dependence that corresponds to the causal effect.
There are many factors that can potentially influence the short-term perfor-
mance (STMC) of the team that called a timeout after a given game instant.
These can be intra-game factors, which vary along the game, such as the scoring
margin, the quarter and the time since the start of the quarter, or inter-game
factors, which vary from game to game, such as the venue conditions, the atten-
dance at the venue, the specific adversary team, the players available and the
teams’ momentum in the season.
It is very intuitive why intra-game factors, which are specific to a game instant,
are considered a cause of both the treatment and outcome, thus being considered
a confounder. In a not so straightforward way, some inter-game factors are also
very likely to affect both the treatment and outcome. For example, a team playing
against a stronger or a weaker adversary would differently request the available
timeouts and the afterwards performance may be differently affected.
Figure 1 shows our causal model graph. Each game instant t can either receive
the treatment assignment At = 1 or At = 0, meaning that the game instant is a
timeout or a regular ball possession, respectively. The variables Xt represent the
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observed covariates, which are intra-game factors specific to the game instant
t: (i) the current quarter (period) (Qt), (ii) the current scoring margin (Pt) and
(iii) the current time in seconds since the start of the period (St). The variables
represented by the node U are the inter-game factors, or the covariates related
to a specific game that influence both the treatment assignment and the game
outcome as exemplified in the last paragraph. Most of these variables are not
directly observed or very difficult to measure—players and coach strategies, teams’
relative skill difference and venue conditions. Hence, we include them in our
graph as a dashed circle. The average rates of scoring margin change before
(∆P tt−λ) and after (∆P
t+λ
t ) the game instant t are also in the graph, as well as
the outcome Y λt that is connected by dashed edges since it is a deterministic
node—a logical function of the other two stochastic nodes.
We are interested in the causal effect of At on Y
λ
t . Since ∆P
t
t−λ is a direct
cause of At and not the reverse—for obvious chronological reasons—, we actually
want to measure the causal effect of At on ∆P
t+λ
t . According to the back-door
criterion [14], if we adjust for U, Xt and ∆P
t
t−λ we block any non-causal influence
of At on ∆P
t+λ
t .
4.3 Data
Because we want to estimate TE as defined in Equation (2), our treated and con-
trol groups are formed by game instants’ STMC, Y λt . As discussed in Section 4.1,
depending on which value we choose for λ, Y λt is not valid—if the short-term
window induced by λ includes another major interruption besides the possible t
or is longer than the start or end of the game. Therefore, our inclusion criteria
for both groups is that STMC exists and can be calculated. For a given λ, the
treated group, {Y λt |At = 1}, is formed by the valid real timeouts’ STMC. The
control group, {Y λt |At = 0}, is formed by any valid game instant t’s STMC that
is not a timeout or any other kind of major interruption.
Since we want to estimate TEh and TEa, we have two treatment groups, one
for timeouts called by home teams and one for timeouts called by away teams.
On the other hand, it does not make sense to classify the control group as either
home or away, thus we have just one control group. We will limit ourselves in
the future to just mention theses treatment groups as either the home treatment
group or away treatment group.
Our data consist of play-by-play information for every game from the 2014-
2015, 2015-2016, 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 National Basketball Association NBA
regular seasons. We crawled the data from the Basketball-Reference website1.
Most of our analysis will consist only of games from the NBA 2016-2017 season
because using more than a single season would lead to very big samples that are
impractical to apply our matching approaches. Also, while we did perform the
same analysis using only other seasons, achieving very similar results, the choice
for the 2016-2017 season is arbitrary, mainly due to be the first season for which
we collected the data.
1 http://www.basketball-reference.com
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The 2016-2017 season had a total of 30 teams and 1,309 games (1,230 for
the regular season and 79 in the playoffs). Considering all games, we computed
281,373 game instants, including the 17,765 identified timeouts (7,754 were called
by home teams and 8,011 by away teams), and the 2,000 mandatory timeouts.
Our datasets, code and further instructions on how to reproduce our results can
be found at our GitHub repository2.
4.4 Matching
The variables U, Xt and ∆P
t
t−λ should be controlled for. In other words, they
should be considered as possible confounders. Consequently, all of these variables
are included in our matching for a valid causal inference. While we consider
U, the inter-game factors, unobserved covariates, we can still control them by
pairing timeout examples with non-timeout examples taken from the same game.
Furthermore, the variable∆P tt−λ is likely the most important confounder covariate
in our model. Indeed, coaches tend to call a timeout when their teams are suffering
from a bad “momentum”, evidencing great influence on the treatment assignment
At. Also, ∆P
t+λ
t , the average rate of scoring margin change after a game instant
t, should be highly causal dependent on ∆P tt−λ. Therefore, in whatever matching
approach we use, timeouts and control examples taken from the same game and
with equal ∆P tt−λ are going to be matched, hopefully, achieving balance for
Xt. We also restrict our matches to be constructed with non-overlapping ball
possessions. This restriction arises from our assumption that λ defines a range of
game instants that are dependent and influence At as discussed in Section 4.1.
We applied three matching procedures: (1) no-balance matching ; (2) Maha-
lanobis matching, and (3) propensity score matching. In the no-balance matching,
each treatment example is paired with a valid control example that has the
same ∆P tt−λ and is taken from the same game. We did not considered Xt in this
matching. For the Mahalanobis matching, we applied the Mahalanobis distance
using all covariates in Xt, i.e., current quarter (Qt), current scoring margin (Pt),
and current clock time in seconds (St) since the start of the quarter. Finally, for
the propensity score matching technique, we applied a simple euclidean distance
match on the estimated scalar propensity score.
The true propensity score s(X) = P(A = 1 |X) is unknown and must be
estimated. Since estimating P(A = 1 |X) can be seen as a classification task, any
a supervised classification model could be used. While logistic regression is the
most common estimation procedure for propensity score, Lee et al. [10] showed
that, in a non-linear dependence scenario, the use of machine learning models
such as boosting regression trees to estimate the propensity score achieves better
covariate balance in the matched sample. Indeed, our treatment assignment
present a great non-linear dependence on its covariates. Take the clock time St,
for example. As explained in Section 4.3, the timeout rules of NBA stimulate
coaches to call a timeout just before a mandatory timeout would have been called
2 https://github.com/pkdd-paper/paper667
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Fig. 2. The STMC (Y λt ) distribution for home and away timeouts, considering three
different ball possession windows λ = 2, 4, 6.
by the official scorer. We use the boosting regression tree algorithm implemented
in the gbm R package [6] to estimate the propensity score using Xt.
Because we restrict timeout and non-timeout pairs to be taken from the same
game, we have a very sparse matching problem. The rcbalance R package [17]
implementation of optimal matching exploits such sparsity of treatment-control
links to reduce computational time for larger problems. We use the optimal
algorithm implemented in this package for all the aforementioned matching
approaches. In addition, before applying any matching technique, we retained in
the control subpopulation only those non-timeout game instants t′ (At′ = 0) for
which the value ∆P t
′
t′−λ is exactly equal to at least one ∆P
t
t−λ calculated to a
real timeout instant t (At = 1) in the same game. This improved the running
performance even more.
5 Experimental Results
In order to find out whether our data shows the generally accepted positive cor-
relation between timeouts and improvements in the “momentum”, we calculated
Y λt for every game instant associated with a timeout t in every single game using
λ = 2, 4, 6. Figure 2 shows the estimated density distribution of the STMC Y λt for
all timeouts, including those called by both home and away teams, but removing
the official timeouts. The sample means and number of valid timeout examples
in each sample are 0.629 and 14, 031 for λ = 2, 0.421 and 12, 225 for λ = 4, 0.302
and 10, 296 for λ = 6, respectively.
These results shows that, when a timeout is called by a team, its momentum
improves by a small positive amount afterwards. For instance, with λ = 4, the
average value of STMC is 0.421. That is, on average, there is an increase of 0.421
points for a team’s scoring margin per possession after it called the timeout.
These results are consistent with previous works mentioned in Section 2 [11, 18,
16, 5, 21]. We applied the non-parametric ones-sample Wilcoxon statistical test
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Table 1. Summary statistics and SMD for balance assessment for matching using home
treatment group. The control (At = 0) and timeout (At = 1) groups are presented
before (BM) and after all three matchings approaches: No-Balance (NB), Mahalanobis
distance (M), and Propensity score (P)
St (mean(sd)) Qt (mean(sd)) Pt (mean(sd))
λ Method At = 0 At = 1 SMD At = 0 At = 1 SMD At = 0 At = 1 SMD
2 BM 363.42 (198.77) 410.03 (168.47) 0.253 2.42 (1.12) 2.68 (1.15) 0.222 1.73 (10.81) -0.00 (10.78) 0.161
NB 363.11 (201.26) 410.20 (168.52) 0.254 2.47 (1.12) 2.68 (1.15) 0.178 0.56 (10.63) 0.00 (10.78) 0.052
M 397.73 (168.83) 410.27 (168.50) 0.074 2.61 (1.11) 2.68 (1.15) 0.062 0.53 (10.86) 0.00 (10.78) 0.049
P 403.85 (163.08) 410.14 (168.50) 0.038 2.67 (1.13) 2.68 (1.15) 0.009 0.23 (11.01) 0.00 (10.78) 0.021
4 BM 351.23 (187.75) 388.45 (153.17) 0.217 2.33 (1.11) 2.58 (1.13) 0.222 1.75 (10.69) 0.22 (11.04) 0.141
NB 351.59 (191.15) 394.10 (151.23) 0.247 2.33 (1.11) 2.58 (1.14) 0.219 0.44 (10.44) 0.33 (11.14) 0.011
M 381.35 (167.92) 393.79 (151.12) 0.078 2.43 (1.04) 2.57 (1.14) 0.135 0.50 (11.06) 0.32 (11.12) 0.016
P 385.03 (162.81) 393.70 (151.37) 0.055 2.56 (1.11) 2.58 (1.14) 0.017 0.38 (11.33) 0.32 (11.12) 0.005
6 BM 334.96 (170.51) 380.80 (143.08) 0.291 2.19 (1.08) 2.49 (1.12) 0.270 1.67 (10.34) 0.33 (11.09) 0.124
NB 332.33 (173.87) 389.79 (139.28) 0.365 2.20 (1.08) 2.48 (1.12) 0.253 0.71 (10.40) 0.79 (11.13) 0.007
M 351.13 (162.90) 389.67 (138.95) 0.255 2.27 (1.02) 2.48 (1.12) 0.200 0.77 (10.80) 0.80 (11.17) 0.002
P 356.99 (160.61) 389.72 (139.63) 0.218 2.35 (1.08) 2.48 (1.12) 0.122 0.72 (10.91) 0.81 (11.16) 0.008
and a bootstrap based test for the mean with the null hypothesis being that
the mean is equal to zero. Both tests for the three different values of λ yielded
p-values numerically equal to zero.
While these results could be used as evidence on why there is such common
and widespread belief that timeouts improves teams’ performance, orbreaks the
momentum, it is not an evidence of the causal effect of timeouts. We move on to
consider the analysis under our causal framework discussed in Section 4.
5.1 Matching Results
Each of the three matching methods was applied twice: one time using the
treatment group with away timeouts and the control group, and the other using
the treatment group with home timeouts and the control group. Some examples
did not find a valid match and, therefore, were not included in the matched
samples. Also, it should be noted that all matches were performed without
replacement.
To evaluate for proper covariate balance between the treatment groups, a
common numerical discrepancy measurement is the difference in means divided
by the pooled standard deviation of each covariate, known as the standardized
mean difference (SMD) [4]. Unlike t-tests, SMD is not influenced by sample sizes
and allows comparison between variables of different measured units. There is no
general consensus on which value of SMD should denote an accepted imbalance
level. Some researches, although, have proposed a threshold of 0.1 [13]. Table 1
summarizes the covariate distribution with its mean and standard deviation
values and the SMD of our matched samples considering all different approaches.
For simplicity, we are only including here the results from the home timeouts
matched samples. Indeed, the away samples showed very similar results and
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it can also be accessible from our GitHub repository3. Also, we do not show
balance for ∆P tt−λ as it is perfectly balanced due to our perfect match on this
covariate. The unmatched sample sizes for control groups are 172, 785, 101, 093
and 49, 403; and, for treatment groups, 6, 912, 6, 048 and 5, 127 with λ = 2, 4, 6,
respectively. For the matched samples, because of our 1:1 matching approach,
the sample sizes are equal in both treatment and control groups, even across the
different matching techniques—for λ = 2, 4, 6, they were 6, 895, 5, 477 and 3, 832,
respectively.
From an initial look we can see that there are very similar results in terms
of covariate balance for all three different matching approaches. Also, with no
surprise, the matched treatment and control samples have equal sizes and the
∆P tt−λ covariate is equally distributed. Comparing the no-balance matching with
the balance in before matching, it is clear that this simple matching procedure
reduces substantially the SMD for all covariates. However, this is not enough to
make the SMD negligible for all cases and hence whatever conclusions based on
the comparison of these no-balance matched samples will be rightly subjected
to doubt. Considering the Mahalanobis matching, it achieved better covariate
balance for all covariates and λ values in comparison with before matching and
no-balance matching. For λ = 2 and λ = 4, all SMDs are bellow 0.1, with the
exception of the Qt covariate in λ = 4, in both analysis. The λ = 6 configuration,
on the other hand, presented the worse SMDs—Pt is the only covariate with
SMD bellow the 0.1 mark. The Mahalanobis matching was not as good as the
Propensity score matching. All covariates have SMDs smaller than 0.1 for λ = 2
and λ = 4 in both analysis. For λ = 6, while Qt and St still had SMD above the
0.1 mark, it is still smaller than the ones obtained in the previous matching for
the same configuration.
Plotting the covariate distributions from both treatment and control groups is
a qualitative alternative of checking proper balance. Figure 3 shows the covariate
distributions for St, Qt and Pt after all three matchings with λ = 4 on the
analysis using timeouts called by the home team. We can see that No-balance and
Mahalanobis matching presented some imbalance for St and Qt. On the other
hand, propensity score matching shows rather similar distributions suggesting a
much better balance. The fact that timeouts and control examples are matched
only if taken from the same game makes it more complicated to find matches
with a more balanced Xt. Mahalanobis matching, while trying to match samples
as close as possible, encounters great difficulties. Propensity score, however,
translates all interactions and non-linearities presented in the joint distribution
of all covariates with the propensity score. This is why its matching was better.
5.2 Timeout Effect
We analyzed our matched data using a Monte Carlo permutation test [2, Vol II,
chapter 10] and difference of means between the two groups as our test statistic.
When the null hypothesis is true, the timeout effect TE defined in (2) is equal to
3 https://github.com/pkdd-paper/paper667
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Fig. 3. The control (magenta) and timeout (turquoise) seconds, quarter and scor-
ing margin covariate (Xt) distributions after all matchings using the home timeouts
treatment group and λ = 4.
zero. The treatment label was permuted ten thousand times. It should be noted
that we have large samples—the number of treatment-control pairs in each test
varies from 3, 766 to 7, 082. Hence, we believe our analysis would mostly benefit
if effect sizes, alongside statistical significance, are taken into account for our
conclusions. Table 2 shows the estimated average timeout effects for the home
(TEh) and the away (TEa) teams. In addition, we have also included in the table
a 99% level confidence interval generated from the p-values obtained with the
Monte Carlo permutation test.
There are two fundamental remarks here. First, the estimated timeout effect
TE is very small for all cases, practically irrelevant during a game. Remember
that the timeout effect TE defined in Equation (2) is the amount by which the
team should expect its scoring margin per possession to change if a timeout were
to be called by them. It would be rather challenging to find the minimum effect
size for which it would be deemed enough to change the teams performance.
It would not be a bad idea, however, to consider it to be an effect of at least
one marginal point. Specially because our assumption is that timeouts have an
effect in the short-term window represented by λ. Yet, from our results, take
the propensity matching with λ = 4, which yielded the largest absolute timeout
effect equal to −0.059, for instance. This means that if a team calls a timeout,
it should expect its scoring margin to decrease 0.059 points per possession in
the next 4 possessions, which can be considered negligible in a basketball game.
Second, by analyzing the confidence intervals, the number of significant tests is
very small given the very large number of examples in each of them. From the 18
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Table 2. The estimated timeout effect for both away (TEa) and home (TEh) timeouts
under different matching procedures and λ values. The respective confidence intervals
for each timeout effect for 99% level is also shown. While some values are statistically
significant, all timeout effects are negligible due to the small effect sizes.
λ Method TEa 99% CI TEh 99% CI
2 No-balance -0.028 (-0.075, 0.020) -0.022 (-0.072, 0.028)
Mahalanobis -0.032 (-0.079, 0.015) -0.017 (-0.067, 0.032)
Propensity -0.044 (-0.092, 0.004) -0.021 (-0.071, 0.028)
4 No-balance -0.043 (-0.082, -0.004) -0.023 (-0.063, 0.017)
Mahalanobis -0.053 (-0.092, -0.013) -0.013 (-0.053, 0.028)
Propensity -0.059 (-0.098, -0.020) -0.032 (-0.072, 0.008)
6 No-balance -0.031 (-0.068, 0.005) -0.036 (-0.072, 0.000)
Mahalanobis -0.046 (-0.083, -0.010) -0.036 (-0.072, 0.000)
Propensity -0.044 (-0.081, -0.008) -0.046 (-0.082, -0.009)
Table 3. Additional analysis for excluding or considering only the last 5 minutes. For
each analysis, the same matching approaches were applied using the new subsets of
data. The results are very similar to the original analysis considering the whole game.
Minus Last 5 Min Only Last 5 Min
λ Method TEa 99% CI TEh 99% CI TEa 99% CI TEh 99% CI
2 No-balance -0.029 (-0.082, 0.024) -0.010 (-0.065, 0.045) -0.083 (-0.115, -0.052) -0.033 (-0.067, 0.001)
Mahalanobis -0.021 (-0.074, 0.032) -0.010 (-0.065, 0.045) -0.091 (-0.122, -0.060) -0.040 (-0.074, -0.006)
Propensity -0.044 (-0.098, 0.009) -0.012 (-0.067, 0.043) -0.094 (-0.125, -0.063) -0.038 (-0.072, -0.004)
4 No-balance -0.036 (-0.078, 0.006) -0.030 (-0.073, 0.013) -0.006 (-0.068, 0.055) 0.038 (-0.029, 0.105)
Mahalanobis -0.055 (-0.097, -0.013) -0.022 (-0.065, 0.020) -0.019 (-0.081, 0.044) 0.026 (-0.041, 0.093)
Propensity -0.057 (-0.099, -0.015) -0.038 (-0.081, 0.004) -0.019 (-0.082, 0.043) 0.007 (-0.060, 0.074)
6 No-balance -0.044 (-0.082, -0.005) -0.041 (-0.079, -0.003) -0.046 (-0.315, 0.223) -0.032 (-0.250, 0.186)
Mahalanobis -0.051 (-0.089, -0.012) -0.040 (-0.078, -0.002) -0.028 (-0.299, 0.244) -0.048 (-0.267, 0.172)
Propensity -0.046 (-0.085, -0.008) -0.055 (-0.093, -0.017) -0.046 (-0.317, 0.224) -0.048 (-0.265, 0.170)
tests, only 6 were statistically significant in the α = 0.001 level. In fact, these
confidence intervals barely include the 0 effect value. Nevertheless, while these
tests were statistically significant, they are still negligible effects. Also, we want
to point it out that we did not perform any adjustment for multiplicity of tests.
Indeed, such adjustment would yield a smaller number of statistically significant
tests.
We went further and investigated the timeout effect TE for two particular
cases: (i) when the last five minutes are excluded and (ii) when only the final
five minutes of the games are taken into account. For both cases, we rerun
the matching approaches on the new subsets of the data. Before executing the
matching approaches, we filtered out from treatment and control groups examples
that happened within the last five minutes of the last quarter (the 4th) of each
game for (i). In a similar fashion, we filtered out from treatment and control
groups examples that happened outside of the last five minutes of each game
for (ii). However, because we ended up with fewer sample units available for
Stop the Clock: Are Timeout Effects Real? 15
matching, we included examples extracted from the other NBA seasons for the
(ii) case, i.e., the 2014-2015, 2015-2016 and 2017-2018 seasons.
The results from both of these new analysis are in Table 3. For the case of
excluding the last five minutes, we can see that we have slightly more statistical
significant tests, 8 out of 18. Still, all of them have small effect sizes, making
them not practically significant. The largest estimated effect is −0.057, which
is found under the same configuration that we found the largest in the original
analysis: TEa for the propensity score matching with λ = 4. For the case of
considering only the last five minutes, the only 5 statistically significant tests
were all found with λ = 2, but again, with very small effect sizes. The largest
absolute effect is −0.094 for propensity score matching.
6 Conclusion
In this work we proposed a causality framework to quantify the effect of timeouts
on basketball games. For the best of our knowledge, we were the first to resort on
the theory of causality to solve this problem. While all previous studies pointed
to a positive timeout effect, by applying our causality model on a large dataset
of official NBA play-by-play data, we concluded that timeouts have no effect
on teams’ performance. This is another example of what statisticians call the
regression to the mean phenomenon. Since most timeouts are called when the
opponent team is scoring more frequently, the moments that follow resemble an
improvement in the team’s performance, but are just the natural game tendency
to return to its average state. We have also stratified our analysis by either
including only the last five minutes or everything but the last five minutes of all
games, but the results pointed to the same conclusion: timeouts have virtually
no effect on team’s performance.
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